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Abstract
In contemporary aesthetics, artistic creativity and the
perception of beauty are the key concepts in explaining
aesthetic consciousness. From the birth of modern aesthetics,
an underlying assumption has been that artistic creativity and
the perception of beauty are each genuinely universal in
human experience, which is worthy of particular attention. To
examine the universal validity of Western aesthetic claims on
these two distinctive subjects, this paper presents a very brief
outline of pre-modern Chinese interpretations of both concepts.
Specifically, in comparison to Kant’s concept of genius and
aesthetic judgment, I draw two conclusions. First, although
there was no concept equivalent to art as an umbrella term to
embrace diverse artistic activities, pre-modern Chinese
intellectuals paid particular attention to originality, naturalness,
and ineffability as common and essential features of artistic
creativity, which show a high degree of similitude with the
Western accounts. The similitude, along with its spontaneous
emergence, attests, to a large extent, to the universality in
experiencing, characterizing, and interpreting artistic creativity.
Second, although there were many words in Chinese
vocabulary similar to beauty, pre-modern Chinese intellectuals
did not give particular conceptual significance to the perception
of beauty. More specifically, in relation to Kant’s conception of
aesthetic judgment and Stolnitz’s definition of aesthetic
attitude, despite its long tradition of a disinterested attitude
towards objects, pre-modern Chinese intellectuals did not
relate this attitude to aesthetic experience. These tentative
conclusions also lead us to question the universal validity of
the association between art and beauty that was created by
modern aesthetics and which contemporary aesthetics still
claims as its legitimate field of research.
Key Words
artistic creativity; the perception of beauty; disinterested
attitude; universal validity; pre-modern China

1. Introduction
From the early modern period, East Asian intellectuals have
been looking for East Asian equivalents to the key concepts of
Western aesthetics. Like many other academic fields, they also
dug up massive amounts of East Asian documents to find
symbolic remains that show a certain degree of similitude to
Western ideas on art and beauty. They intended to
demonstrate the spontaneous development of aesthetics in
East Asian traditions. The underlying assumption is that
Western aesthetics offers the full-fledged, or the most
advanced, forms in studying artistic activities and aesthetic
experience. However, it is time to raise fundamental questions
not only as to the appropriateness of the hitherto East Asian

methodologies but also as to the universal validity of Western
aesthetic claims.
The empirical universality of artistic creation and the
perception of beauty does not guarantee universal validity in
understanding and explaining aesthetic consciousness.
Particularly because of the inexplicable nature of aesthetic
consciousness, it is one thing to assert that the experiences of
aesthetic consciousness are self evidently true and universal,
and it is a different thing to understand and translate them into
human languages. Taking into consideration the long traditions
of artistic activities and the interpretive approaches to human
consciousness, along with the incomparable history of
documentations on these issues, the aesthetic tradition of premodern China is the most reliable yardstick for assessing the
universal validity of Western aesthetic claims.
In this paper, I present very brief historical outlines of premodern Chinese interpretations of art and beauty, which
contemporary aesthetics still claims as its legitimate domains
for research. More specifically, taking advantage of Kant’s
conceptions of genius and aesthetic judgment, this paper
examines two correlated questions. First, in comparison to
Western counterparts, how did they explain artistic creativity,
which has been understood as the most essential feature of
artistic activities and one of the most puzzling issues in
contemporary aesthetics? Second, are there any accounts for
the perception of beauty that are equivalent or comparable to
the Western conception of aesthetic experience? More
specifically, in relation to Kant’s conception of aesthetic
judgment and Stolnitz’s definition of aesthetic attitude, how did
they understand disinterested attitude toward objects, one of
the central issues for Chinese intellectuals from the early
stage? Particularly, did they relate it to aesthetic experience?
Through the course of suggesting answers to these questions, I
draw two overarching, albeit tentative, conclusions. First,
although there was no concept of art as an umbrella term to
embrace diverse artistic activities, pre-modern Chinese
intellectuals paid attention to originality, naturalness, and
ineffability as the common and essential features of artistic
creativity. Second, although there were many words similar to
beauty, they did not give particular conceptual significance to
the perception of beauty, nor did they relate a disinterested
attitude, or the disinterested state of mind, to aesthetic
experience. On this basis, I pose two big questions to
contemporary aesthetics in the conclusion.
2. Artistic creativity
Creativity and originality are concepts that have supplied the
very ground for the autonomy of art. The paired concept
demarcates the boundary of the artistic realm from those of
science and techniques. In contrast to Aristotle’s venture to
formulate the rules of making (poïesis), Kant summons up a
mythological term, genius, to refer to the artistic ability of
production, and associated it with originality as its primary
characteristic:
That it cannot itself describe or indicate
scientifically how it brings its product into being,
but rather that it gives the rule as nature, and

hence the author of a product that he owes to his
genius does not know himself how the ideas for it
come to him, and also does not have it in his
power to think up such things at will or according
to plan, and to communicate to others precepts
that would put them in a position to produce
similar products. (V308)[1]
Here, instead of claiming to have revealed the secret of
creative power, Kant intends to clarify his agnostic stance to
say that one cannot deny the existence and function of an
inner power of creation but this power is unknowable, even to
those who exercise it. Nature here signifies a sort of seeming
contradiction that an author must have followed “the rule” to
create an original work of art, in the sense that a work of art
with originality is not an accidental production, and that the
author does so without any intentional and conscious efforts to
conform to the rule. At the risk of oversimplification, the rule of
creativity indeed exists and works but remains in the realm
that transcends human knowledge and language. Otherwise,
the uniqueness of artistic creativity as a kind of productive
power must be reduced into the area of science, more
specifically, into the field of technology. From a different angle,
with the concepts of originality and naturalness, Kant clarifies
and thus draws attention to the limit of understanding and
language in explaining artistic creativity.
An exploration of the history of East Asian art theories leads to
a bold claim that such attention to the characteristics of artistic
creativity is not unique to the Western aesthetic tradition.
Despite the enormous philosophical differences that lie
between the two traditions, artistically oriented Chinese
thinkers also paid attention to the mysterious characteristics of
artistic production, such as creativity, originality, naturalness,
and ineffability, that deserve an analytical comparison.
Arguably, the earliest writing on artistic creativity, despite its
nascent state, is found in the third-century work, The Poetic
Exposition on Literature (wen fu), by Lu Ji (261-303). The
following part of it is particularly relevant:
1-1: Thus it begins: retraction of vision, reversion
of listening,
Absorbed in thought, seeking all around,
1-2: My essence galloping to the world’s eight
bounds,
My mind roaming ten thousand yards, up and
down.

2-1: And when it is attained: light gathers about
moods (qing) and they grow in brightness,
Things (wu) become luminous and draw one
another forward;
2-2: I quaff the word-hoard’s spray of droplets,
And roll in my mouth the sweet moisture of the
Six Classics;

2-3: I drift between Heaven and the abyss, at rest
in the current,
I bathe in the falling stream, immersed in its
waters;

3: Then, phrases from the depths emerge
struggling as when the swimming fish, hooks in
their mouths, emerge from the bottom of the
deepest pool;
and drifting intricacies of craft (or drifting ornate
expressions) flutter down, as when the wining
bird, caught by stringed arrow, plummets from
the tiered clouds.

4-1: He gathers in writing (wen) omitted by a
hundred generations,
Picks rhymes neglected for a thousand years;
4-2: It falls away—that splendid flowering of
dawn, already unfurled,
But there opens the unblown budding of evening.

5: He observes all past and present in a single
moment,
Touches all the world in the blink of an eye.[2]

This third-century piece of writing is truly groundbreaking in
the history of East Asian art theory.[3] Broadly, it indirectly
declares the independence of literary creation from statecentered perspectives and ethically oriented traditions that had
restricted the ambit of literature within the normative
constraints. More specifically, this declaration is based on the
fact that no earlier literary thoughts had paid particular
attention to the process of artistic creativity, which still remains
at present as one of the most mysterious spheres of artistic
activities. In the passage cited above, Lu attempts to cast light
on the aesthetic consciousness of literary creation.
To sum up in an analytical manner, this exposition begins with
normative descriptions on the initial perceptive and mental
condition (1-1) and the thus-achieved unrestrained state of
mind (1-2). It continues to illuminate the primordial state of
creativity; the gradual manifestations of the inner dimension
(“moods”) and the outer sphere (“things”) in the author’s
consciousness (2-1); their encounters with linguistic and
intellectual elements (2-2); and the author’s unintentional and
unpremeditated ride on the flow of creative process (2-3).
After that, literary expressions that capture the primordial
encounters between the author’s intentionality and the flow of
language into concrete terms naturally emerge in the mind of
the author (3). Then, the author put down thus created

unprecedented (“omitted,” “neglected”) expressions in a
passive manner (4-1), that embody creative and original
qualities (“the unblown budding”) (4-2). Finally, the author
observes that a literary work thus produced represents
universal values in a limited use of language (5).
Concerning creativity and originality, Lu Ji highlights, with
poetic articulation, that the process of production is wholly
natural in the sense that the conscious intervention of the
author is completely neglected or, more strongly, disallowed.
In this sense, the core of literary creativity described in Part 2
and Part 3 is reminiscent of Kant’s words that “Beautiful art is
an art to the extent that it seems at the same time to be
nature.” (V308). The role of the author is minor, as he simply
“gathers” and “picks” words and rhymes that spontaneously
manifest themselves in the author’s consciousness, even at the
last stage of the creative process. The requirement of
originality, poetically expressed in Part 4, comes to be achieved
purely consequently rather than deliberately.
Lu Ji’s elaboration does not signify a claim to articulating
artistic creativity in a scientific manner. Rather, his attention to
the creative process signals the burgeoning awareness that the
true uniqueness of arts goes beyond comprehension and
language. The unbridgeable gap between creativity and human
language drives him to approach this operative but ever
elusive sphere only by means of resorting to artistic, here
poetic, formation of language. Lu does not even touch upon
“the rule” that may regulate artistic creativity. Instead, he
underscores ineffable naturalness in the emergence of literary
expressions that the author is expected to acquire only through
“rest[ing]” on the self-regulating (ziran in Chinese, meaning
“naturalness”) process of creativity itself.
Lu Ji’s focus on naturalness, originality, and ineffability in
creativity opened a new horizon for Chinese art theories. In
literary thoughts, Liu Xie (ca. 465-520) devotes a full chapter,
titled “Spirit Thought” (shensi), in his monumental work,
Carving Dragons with Literary Mind (wenxin tiaolong), in order
to further illuminate the mysterious characteristics of literary
creativity.[4] In art theory, a literary man, Fu Zai (d. 813),
depicts a process of painting performed by a literati-painter,
Zhang Zao (eighth century), as follows:
Right in the middle of the room he sat down with
his legs spread out, took a deep breath, and his
spiritual ability (shenji) began to issue forth.
Those present were as startled as if lightning
were shooting across the heavens or a whirlwind
sweeping up into the sky. Ravaging and pulling,
spreading in all directions, the ink seemed to be
spitting from his flying brush. He clapped his
hands with a cracking sound. In a flurry of
divisions and contractions, strange shapes were
suddenly born. When he had finished, there stood
pine trees, scaly and riven, crags steep and
precipitous, clear water, and turbulent clouds. He
threw down his brush, got up, and looked around
in every direction. It seemed as if the sky had
cleared after a storm, to reveal the true essence
of ten thousand things.

Then, Fu Zai presents a generalized description on Zhang Zao
and his art:
When we contemplate Master Zhang’s art, it is
not painting, it is the very Dao itself. Whenever
he was engaged in painting, one already knew
that he had left mere skill (jiqiao) far behind. His
consciousness (yi) reach into the dark mysteries
of things, and for him, things lay not in the
physical senses, but in the spiritual part of his
mind (lingfu). And thus he was able to grasp them
in his mind (xin), and make his hand accord with
it.
It seems that, unlike Lu Ji and Liu Xie, Fu Zai pays much less
attention to the creative process itself. Instead of going into
details, as seen in expressions such as “spitting from his flying
brush,” Fu highlights the suddenness of the process. Analogies
to natural phenomena like “lighting,” “whirlwind,” and “the sky
had cleared after a storm” are deliberately chosen to
emphasize its naturalness in addition to suddenness. Here,
suddenness and naturalness figuratively imply a creative
process that is entirely free from the intentional intervention of
the painter, as seen in Lu Ji’s poetic exposition.
In this terse description of a painting process, Fu focuses on
the naturally given ability of creation inherent in the painter.
He identifies Zhang as a master painter, “spoiled with the
generous gifts of Heaven” (tianzong zhi si). Similarly, the term
shenji, here translated as spiritual ability, means the innate
mysterious ability of creation. As a compound word, shen has
connotations such as wondrous, unfathomable, and ineffable,
whereas ji has a meaning of mechanical function. Fu then
contrasts it with “mere skill,” which connotes a deliberate
manipulation of imitable techniques. The account that the spirit
of Zhang is connected to the mysterious realm (“His ideas
reach into the dark mysteries of things”) without being
constrained by his “physical senses” also signifies Fu’s
attention to the mysterious characteristics of artistic creativity,
such as profundity and ineffability. Overall, instead of
particularizing the creative process itself that is, by nature,
ineffable, Fu encapsulates it into these esoteric terminologies
that are largely reminiscent of Kant’s description of genius as
“the gift of nature” that “is apportioned to each immediately
from the hand of nature” (V309).
In the eleventh century, Su Shi (1037-1101), arguably the
most prominent cultural icon throughout pre-modern Chinese
history, comprehensively inherits previous expressions on the
creative process and the naturally given ability of artistic
creation. On this basis, he reestablishes these ideas on a more
philosophical ground. Specifically, he focuses attention on
naturalness and originality as the primary qualities of artistic
creativity, which is also reminiscent of Kant’s definition of
genius. In addition, he broadens the scope of these ideas by
applying them to diverse artistic fields of poetry, painting, and
calligraphy. Although there was no single umbrella concept
equivalent to art in the West that may bind diverse artistic
activities together, he draws attention to artistic creativity and
its naturally inherent ability as the common and essential
features of them. Due to his status as an unchallenged
versatile artist, his accounts on artistic creativity held

considerable authority over later discussions on arts in premodern East Asia.[5]
3. The perception of beauty and aesthetic attitude
The perception of beauty is not universal. On the contrary, it is
contingent on in what way this experience is understood,
evaluated, and incorporated into the entire value system of a
culture. An exploration for equivalents to beauty or related
ideas in East Asian tradition leads to a result nearly opposite to
that of art. As seen above, no term equivalent to the concept
of art in the West existed until the concept was translated into
yishu, with Chinese characters, in the early modern period.
Nonetheless, the awareness of artistic creativity and its innate
ability spontaneously emerged as early as the third century
and led to the growing attention to them as the core features
of diverse artistic activities. In contrast, there are dozens of
words in the Chinese vocabulary that can be translated into
‘beauty’ or ‘beautiful.’ None of them, however, is as significant
and all-inclusive as the concept of beauty in the Western
context. In the early modern period of East Asia, a Chinese
character, mei, was chosen as an equivalent to ‘beauty.’ In
pre-modern times, however, this word refers to, with rare
exceptions, a visual quality that arouses instinctive sensory
satisfaction that lacks any profound connotations. Rather, it
was consistently coupled with a warning against our instinctive
inclinations toward ostensibly attractive objects. Apart from
works of art, therefore, objects in the natural realm, including
landscapes, were also rarely highly praised for the reason of
the quality of beauty. For this reason, the beautiful rarely
attracted intellectual attentions, nor was it singled out as a
core value to pursue in East Asian traditions. It seems that
preceding searches for East Asian counterparts for the idea of
beauty in the Western aesthetic sense was doomed to failure
from the beginning.
On the other hand, why the experience of beauty, if it is truly
universal, results in such a substantial difference in evaluating
it deserves further investigation. In relation to aesthetic
consciousness, this question redirects our concern to the
subjective sphere. Specifically, how different are the traditions
of the East and the West in understanding and explaining the
nature of consciousness in interacting with the world in
general, to which the perception of beauty belongs? In a
comparative perspective, the idea that attracts particular
attention is disinterestedness.
In the statement, “Taste is the faculty for judging an object or
a kind of representation through a satisfaction or
dissatisfaction without any interest. The object of such a
satisfaction is called beautiful,” (V211) Kant proposes
disinterestedness as the key mental condition for aesthetic
judgment. In the twentieth century, Jerome Stolnitz rephrases
it as “disinterested and sympathetic attention to and
contemplation of any object of awareness whatever, for its own
sake alone” and calls it “the aesthetic attitude,” thus
underlining its conditional nature for the aesthetic
experience.[6]
A review of East Asian aesthetic tradition throws a question on
the connection between aesthetic attitude and the perception
of beauty. Specifically, if the subjective feeling of satisfaction

or dissatisfaction arises in the mental condition of
disinterestedness, in response to a certain object, does this
experience invariably lead to the perception of beauty?
Otherwise, is the aesthetic attitude merely a necessary, rather
than sufficient, condition for the aesthetic judgment, so that
disinterestedness may also lead to an experience other than
the perception of beauty? Concerning these questions, Chinese
intellectual history suggests an intriguing answer. In summary,
an idea that is fairly similar to disinterestedness was formed as
early as the third century B.C.E. and, later, this idea was
conjoined with the feeling of pleasure as it relates to artistic
activities and appreciations. However, this combination of
disinterestedness, arts, and pleasure was hardly associated
with the perception of beauty.
The Zhuangzi, one of the ancient Daoist classics, deals with an
ideal mental attitude toward the world as one of its key issues.
The central feature that the text attributes to this attitude is
emptiness. It contrasts this attitude, called “xin zhai” (literally,
“the fasting of the mind”), with a state of the mind called
cheng xin (literally, “a made-up mind”) that is regulated by the
ideas of right and wrong, and also truth and falseness. Nor is
the empty state of the mind swayed by feelings of happiness,
joy, and so forth. This attitude of the mind is completely free
(literally, “empty”) from any subjective interests, such as
possession and utility, and also diverse evaluative criteria.
These characterizations are reminiscent of disinterestedness to
a large degree. In this vein, the text compares this ideal
attitude to a mirror free of any dust on its surface that is,
according to its description, “not welcoming external things as
they come or escorting them as they go.” In this sense, this
attitude is also differentiated from an apathetic attitude toward
things that rejects the validity of interactions with objects.
However, there is no sign that the text connects this
disinterested attitude to a particular experience, let alone the
perception of beauty. Rather, the Zhuangzi calls attention to
the relativistic nature of aesthetic judgment and its ensuing
negative effects on the ideal state of the mind.[7]
The precautious, or sometimes even adverse, attitude to
external things was predominant until the mid-eleventh
century. Concerning emotions and aesthetic experiences
arising in response to external things and events, Confucianism
also directed the focus of attention to its precarious aspect. In
the eleventh century, a fundamental change was introduced by
Ouyang Xiu (1007-1072) and Su Shi. Ouyang Xiu, a towering
figure in Chinese intellectual history, consistently characterized
his personal attitude toward calligraphy, in creation and
appreciation, as a pursuit of pleasure. No precautious remarks
are attached to this pursuit. In comparison to earlier
justifications that artistic activities resorted to their utilities in
illuminating morality and truth, that is, the Way, Ouyang
refused to combine his attitude toward calligraphy with any
external purposes or interests, which reminds us of Kant’s
combination of aesthetic pleasure, or satisfaction, and
disinterestedness. Unlike precious concerns, according to
Ouyang, this mode of attention to artistic creation and
appreciation is exceptional because it is well compatible with
enjoyment and pleasure without involving any undesirable
consequences. Ouyang named this kind of special attitude “yu
xin” or “yu yi” (lodging one’s interest and attention to things).

Su Shi, who claims the status of the legitimate heir of Ouyang,
directly adopted this idea and further elaborates on it.
Concerning the subjective attitude toward external objects, Su
contrasts yu yi with detachment and attachment. Detachment,
or an indifferent attitude, drives a subject to sacrifice even
morally acceptable feelings of happiness but contradicts the
natural inclinations of humanity. At the other end of the
spectrum, attachment, or an excessive attention to particular
things, is self-contradictory, first, because it is more likely to
result in a tragic consequence than happiness and, second,
because it tends to make the self be overwhelmed and
determined by external things. Contrastingly, Su highlights
that there is an appropriate attitude between these two
opposite extremes that enables one to experience pleasure in
the middle of paying attention to external things without
bringing out undesirable outcomes. He thus describes the
attitude of yu yi as an attitude of moderate distance from
external things.[8]
In the following inscription, Su Shi elaborates on the
compatibility between pleasure and attention to objects:
All things have some attractive aspect that is
worth looking at; and anything that is worth
looking at may bring pleasure (le; or happiness),
not just things that are extraordinary, imposing,
or ornate. One can become gaily drunk even on
weak wine or dregs, and the appetite may be
satisfied even by vegetables, berries, and nuts.
Extrapolating from this, where in the world might
I go that I could not feel pleasure?
The reason people seek good fortune and avoid
calamity is that good fortune brings pleasure,
while calamity brings grief. However, people’s
desires are infinite, and yet the things in the
world that can satisfy those desires are finite.
Therefore, valuations of good and bad (or
beautiful and ugly) fight inside us, and the
problem of which things to acquire and which to
reject hangs before us. Consequently, our
moments of pleasure are few, while our moments
of grief are many. This amounts to seeking
calamity and avoiding good fortune. How could
that be human nature?
The fact is, people let themselves be
overwhelmed by things. People wander around
inside the realm of things (you yu wu zhi nei),
rather than outside it (wu zhi wai). Now, it is true
of all things, whether big or small, that if we look
at them from the inside, they seem towering and
huge. With all this hugeness towering over us, we
become befuddled and are at a loss. It is like
watching a fight through a crack in the wall. How
can you tell which side is winning? So it is that
notions of good and bad (or beautiful and ugly)
are haphazardly created, with happiness and
sorrow following upon them. Is it not
regrettable?[9]

In this inscription, Su Shi rephrases yu yi attitude into the
attitude of “wander[ing] around outside the realm of things.”
The opposite of this attitude is described as the state of mind
that is “overwhelmed by things,” which also indicates that, in
this condition, one’s attitude to things is predetermined by
personal interests. Therefore, one tends to evaluate the quality
of things in accordance with personal interests (“valuations of
good and bad fight inside us”), instead of listening to the sense
of pleasure or displeasure that one spontaneously feels in the
course of interacting with things. Pleasure here does not mean
a purpose to pursue. Rather, it is a consequence that is
expected to bring out, when one takes the proposed attitude,
in one’s interaction with things. Here, Su advises that in one’s
interaction with things one should switch the focus of attention
from the objective qualities and values of things
(“extraordinary, imposing, or ornate”) to a subjective attitude
toward things. Therefore, it becomes least important what
kinds of things to “acquire” or “reject” because pleasure as the
ultimate end hinges upon the state of one’s attitude. In this
vein, Su expands the range of appreciation, to use Stolnitz’s
words, to “any object of awareness whatever.”
One thing to note is that this inscription includes equivalents to
key ideas in Western concepts of the aesthetic attitude and the
aesthetic experience, such as disinterestedness, pleasure,
subjective attitude, and judgment of an object, but this
combination of ideas is not associated with the perception of
beauty. Unlike their predecessors who consistently underline
the precautious attitude, Ouyang Xiu and Su Shi boldly defend
the pursuit of pleasure in relationship with objects by
formulating the special subjective attitude that, they believe,
makes subjective pleasure not inconsistent with moral values.
However, they have no intent to associate subjective pleasure
arising in the disinterested attitude with the idea of beauty.
Particularly, Su Shi argues that desirable pleasure has little to
do with the qualities of an object and that the disinterested
attitude on the subjective side extends the possibility of
satisfaction to the limit.
Neo-Confucianism, which ascended to the state orthodoxy in
thirteenth-century China and then dominated the East Asian
intellectual world until the end of the pre-modern period, also
drew particular attention to the disinterested state of mind.
However, this morally oriented ideology set apart the possible
connection between this attitude and the sense of beauty even
further. Zhu Xi (1130-1200), the de facto founder of this
intellectual tradition, defines disinterestedness (gong) as the
original state of the mind, and consistently contrasts it with the
mind stimulated by personal interests (si). He describes the
disinterested state of mind as the precondition for morality in
two ways. Internally, the state of mind without personal
interests is the essential condition for ensuring the
manifestation of innate moral nature. Externally, the
disinterested attitude is a prerequisite for acquiring true
knowledge, in the course of investigating objects and events.
However, he also hardly associates the disinterested state of
mind with aesthetic experience. He does not deny either the
value of beauty as an objective quality of an object or the
spontaneity of satisfactory feeling in reaction to such an object.
Nonetheless, because human nature is identified as the
ultimate origin of morality, the perception of beauty has no

ground for validating its genuineness. Rather, in his
metaphysical framework, the sense of beauty falls into the
category of personal interest that is likely to obstruct the
spontaneous manifestation of moral nature, mostly because
the satisfaction that the sense of beauty may bring about is
limited to the perceiver alone without accompanying any moral
significance.
4. Conclusion
From a comparative perspective, I have reached two mutually
opposite conclusions. Concerning art, although they did not
construct a concept equivalent to arts in Western aesthetics,
pre-modern Chinese thinkers understood artistic creativity in a
strikingly similar way as philosophers of the modern West, like
Kant, did. Those who were sympathetic to artistic activities
took note of the uniqueness of artistic production and ventured
to translate it into human language. In so doing, they
presented originality, naturalness, ineffability, and the
transcendence of rules of imitation as the distinctive features of
artistic creativity, which apparently resembles Kant’s concept
of genius. Note that this way of interpretation spontaneously
emerged in the third century in literary theory and that it
recurred around five centuries later in the theory of painting.
This fact, and its spontaneous nature, in particular, attests to
the universality in experiencing, characterizing, and
interpreting artistic creativity to a large extent.
Concerning beauty, on the contrary, it seems that for premodern Chinese intellectuals, the perception of beauty was not
an exceptional experience that motivated them to delve into.
At the risk of overgeneralization, the idea of beauty did never
take a special status comparable to truth and morality.
Differently put, the category of the Way was not extended to
include beauty as a sense perception. Rather, the beautiful was
mostly regarded as a cause of delusion that misleads one into
pursuing superficial values. If beauty means an appreciation of
objective qualities of objects and phenomena, such as order,
harmony, excellence, and so forth, they might describe it by
different terms than ‘beautiful.’ If beauty has more to do with a
subjective feeling of pleasure or satisfaction, they hardly
constructed a metaphysical foundation on which they would
ascribe special significance to this sort of sense perception. The
aesthetic tradition of pre-modern China urges us to re-examine
the universal validity of the connection between a particular
subjective perception and the disinterested attitude of a
subject to the notion of aesthetic experience because tradition
shows that either of such a subjective perception or a
subjective attitude cannot necessarily be linked to aesthetic
experience.
One the basis of the tentative conclusions above, if they are
valid, one more issue that we should reexamine is the
connection between art and beauty that was made at the birth
of modern aesthetics. Pre-modern Chinese intellectuals who
discerned the deeply profound nature of artistic creativity paid
attention to its resemblance to the unfathomable creative
process of nature that they also called the Way. Morally
oriented figures, such as Neo-Confucians, emphasized the
moral effects of artistic creation because they believed the
truly genuine manifestation of the Way, or human nature, must

represent moral norms and values. None of them, however,
found any reason to connect the essentially awe-inspiring
experience from artistic creation to the perception of beauty
that, they thought, may have a precarious effect on
comprehending the Way.
On this basis, the pre-modern Chinese tradition urges us to
throw big questions to contemporary aesthetics. First, is it
possible, or even proper, to demonstrate the universality of
aesthetic consciousness in relation to the concept of beauty,
without resorting to a metaphysical foundation? From a
different angle, is it justifiable for contemporary aesthetics, as
a discipline of philosophy, to deal with the sense of beauty as a
genuinely exceptional experience among sense perceptions, in
general? Second, is it still legitimate for contemporary
aesthetics to claim both art and beauty at once as its proper
subjects? From a different angle, unless it is a structural legacy
of the past, can contemporary aesthetics provide a cogent
explanation about the possible connection between these two
concepts?
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